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Opinions expressed in this section are not necessarily those of GRILA. |
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Democratization and peace in Africa (By KLAY KIEH)
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KLAY KIEH (G.), Democratization and peace in Africa, in: Journal of asian and African Studies, 31, 1996, 1-2, pp. 99-111.
Introduction
More than three decades ago, Africa was blanketed by a wave of euphoria that was characterized by a sense of relief, hope and great optimism for the future. This phenomenon was propelled by the collapse of European colonialism, and its associated superstructure of dehumanization, repression and exploitation. Jeffress Ramsay provides an excellent description of the declonization drama:
"The times were electric. In country after country, the flags of Britain, Belgium and France were replaced by the banners of the new states, whose leaders offered idealistic promises to remake the continent and the world. Hopes were high, and the most ambitious of goals seemed obtainable. Even non-Africans spoke of the resources-rich continent as being on the verge of a development take off. Some of the old, racist myths about Africa were at last being questioned." (1)
Regrettably, "political independence" has failed to bear the fruits of democracy and peace: The African ruling classes have betrayed the trust and confidence of their peoples. For example, colonial repression has been replaced with a neocolonial variant: The economies of African states are plagued with the malaise of underdevelopment; social services are meager and inaccessible to the vast majority of African peoples; and conflicts-both interstate and civil-have become prevalent. Consequently, for most Africans, independence has been more of a desperate struggle for survival, rather than an exhilarating path to development.(2)
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, it will assess the crusade for democratization and peace in Africa. Second, it will evaluate the conundrums that have obviated against democratization and peace. Third, it will discuss the prospects for democratization and peace.
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Conceptual issues
It is important to establish the conceptual contexts in which the three major issues will be discussed. In the case of democratization, it is the process of creating an enabling environment in a polity that allows people at all levels to exercise•control and authority over their own affairs, without the intrusion of state terror and countemroductive policies.
Democracy is the final end product of democratization. It entails a state of affairs in which people exercise political and economic rights - the rights of free speech, the press, association, employment, education, health care and a decent place to live, among others.
Peace may be defined operationally as a situation in which a society meets the basic needs of its people, protect and respect their civil liberties, and provides a fair and just legal system for peacefully resolving conflicts.
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The current wave of democratization and peace
The African peoples' perspective
Historically, the African Peoples have struggled for democratization and democracy. For example, during the colonial era, they challenged European tyranny and injustice. Stalwarts like Queen Nzinga of Angola mobilized their people in resisting the imposition of colonialism. Similarly, throughout the post-independence period, the African masses in various countries have struggled against various indigenous tyrants and despots, who have and continue to rain repression, oppression, suppresion and socio-economic malaise. For example, the masses of Kenya and Zaire, among others, have and continue to struggle against their respective despots.
Ultimately, the African peoples preferred a process of democratization that would address the perennial problems of political repression and economic deprivation and exploitation. In other words, they believe that political rights or procedural democracy is important for providing them with the political space that is indispensable to the pursuance of long-term economic prosperity that benefits the majority, rather than the minority ruling classes.
The Western perspective
Interestingly, since the end of the "cold war", the twin issues of democratization and peace in Africa have become major items on the global agenda: Western states under the leadership of the United States have maintained that this new development is a demonstration of their resolve to usher in a "new world order", based on democracy, peace and development. Accordingly, these Western countries and their international financial institutions - the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank - have designed "special projects" with the ostensible goal of promoting democracy and peace in Africa. Some observers have referred to this development as the "second wave of liberation in Africa".(3) For example, in the United States the Carter Presidential Center, the National Endowment for Democracy and the United States Institute of Peace have become major conduits for promoting democratization and peace in Africa and elsewhere. Correspondingly, election-monitoring has become a new growth industry: observers and monitors from various Western governments and private organizations have become the midwives for delivering democracy and peace in Africa. Interestingly, the very Western powers - the United States and others - which have stymied democratization and undermined peace, by supporting repressive regimes in Africa in pursuit of their "perceived national interest" have suddenly been transformed into agents ef democratization.
According to the West, the impediments to democratization and peace are endemise to the economic, political and socio-cultural fabric of African African states. Thus, the West has posited that democracy and peace can only be attained in African states, if the latter adopt the Wester liberal democratic model and its attendant political economy. Specifically, Western governments have designed a "blueprint of democracy and peace for Africa", based on several tenets. First, primacy needs to be accorded to constitutionalism. This would entail the development of a legal-political architecture that delineates the rights of citizens - the freedom of speech, the press, association, thought, religion, and movement, among others - the structures and processes of government, land nurtures,the sanctity of the "rule of law". The net benefit would be the development of permanent institutions and traditions that are germane to ensuring democracy and peace.
Second and related, a competitive party system must be developed, and free and fair elections must be held regularly. In the spirit of the "Lockian Social Contract", these elections will ensure that the "governors are accountable to the governed". In other words, elections will serve as referenda on the performance of the govemment: If the government performs well based on the electorate's assessment, its mandate will be renewed. Conversely, if the government performs poorly, the people would remove it from office. This process would then further the legitimacy of the regime.
Third, a strong civil society needs to be established. Such a pluralistic multiplex will embody the divergent societal groups and their attendant interests, and seek to harmonize their competing agendas through negotiation, accommodation and compromise. The central function of these groups will be to use their individual and collective independent and autonomous bases of power to check on the government. In other words, these groups will provide oversight to help ensure that the government operates within the parameters set by the constitutional architecture.
Fourth, the only development route that can ensure democracy and peace is capitalism. Accordingly, African states are summoned to remain committed to the capitalist ethos private ownership of the major means of production, the sanctity of private property, the centrality of the profit motive, rugged individualism and a limited state.
Although the Western-based panacea for democracy and peace in Africa has some utility in the political area, overall they do not take into account the historic antecedent of the area: They negate the impact of slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism in creating the foundation for repression, dehumanization, exploitation, conflict, poverty and peripheralization. In other words, any analysis of the obstacles to democracy and peace in Africa must be couched in the historical context of the continent's development, especially after its contact with Europe.
Another major problem is that the "Wester brand of democratization" accords primacy to political procedures as the deus ex machina of democracy. Hence, they negate the fact that political rights, freedoms and procedures are incomplete, if they do not improve the material conditions of the people. As Jean-Pierre Langellier notes, "the Africa which moves is demanding not only political democracy, but economic democracy".(4)
The other major drawback is that Western countries in a clear demonstration of ethnocentrism behave as if democracy and peace are indigenous to their own political cultures. On the contrary, the empirical evidence demonstrates that some European liberal democracies have had a history of tyranny and some of the most violent conflicts in the annals of human experience. For example, the "McCarthy era" in the United States was symptomatic of the violation of human rights. The point is that historically the processes of democratization and peace have developed over time, based on the objective conditions and experiences of the countries involved.
Similarly, Western countries give the impression that democracy and peace can be attained "overnight". They refuse to admit that the level of development which these twin processes have attained in Western societies took centuries. For example, the establishment of democratic political structures and processes spanned several decades in Britain, even after the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215. Similarly, France experienced political turmoil, including various authoritarian reginies, after its revolution in 1789. Hence, these processes require time and patience, because there will be periods of both progress and setbacks.
Also, the nature of authoritarian politics and variants of dictatorships are treated exclusively as simply products of the "cold war," or at the very best evidence that there is a "special problem" in Africa. (5) The region's experiences and location in the interrational division of labor which bequeathed a violent, distant, non-hegemonic, unstable, and weak state are assumed and not used as background for explaining the reasons why authoritarianism thrives in social formations in Africa. (6) In short, the analyses provided by Wester countries failed to take cognizance of the political economy that has fostered authoritarianism, and its derivatives of repression, oppression and exploitation.
Correspondingly, the role of some Wester governments-the United States and others- in obstructing democracy, and helping sow the seeds of co.nflict is neglected. For example, the United States supported General Mobutu, and came to his help every time he got into trouble.(7) France put Bokassa in office, and when he proved an embarrassment, brought David Darko back in the plane with the French paras who removed Bokassa.(8)
The nature and impact of capitalism on African countries is romanticized. First, contrary to Western arguments, capitalism is operationally antithetical to democracy. This is because the former is inherently based on exploitation, while the latter espouses both economic and political equality. Second, since their colonization, African states have always followed the capitalist path to development; however, to paraphrase Andre Gunder Frank, capitalism has engendered development in Western countries, but fostered underdevelopment in African states. Hence, it would be paradoxical for African countries to recommit themselves to the very path of development that has put them in the abyss of poverty and marginalization.
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The obstacles to democratization and peace
The nature and dynamics of the neocolonial state
The neocolonial state and its peripheral capitalist economy pose the greatest obstacle to democratization and peace in Africa. In order to examine the ways in which the neocolonial state undermines democracy and peace, it is important to first briefly decipher its historical development. It was created by the European colonial powers as a vehicle for establishing and maintaining their control over the peoples of Africa. First, its bureaucratic apparatus was directly controlled by the colonial power through its designated agents. Second, it relied primarily on the use of force to induce compliance from the colonized. As Michael Crowder observes, "[The colonial state engaged] in burning of villages, desctruction of crops, killing of women and children, and the execution of leaders".(9) Third and related, it suppressed the rights of African workers, in order to help ensure the private accumulation of capital by businesses from the colonial power. Fourth, it controlled the economy for and on behalf of the colonial power and private European capitalists. Fifth, it served as a mediator among the various factions of the colonial ruling class.
Interestingly, the nature of the state did not change with the granting of "political independence" to African states. The nature of the colonial disengagement from most of Africa, and the rest of the Third World generally, ensured that the independent state would become a neocolonial state, in order to preserve the same, basic colonial relationships of domination and exploitation.(10) Accordingly, deeply embedded in the contemporary African state are a number of characteristics and behavioral dispositions that originate in the colonial era.(11) One is its repressive nature. For example, although the constitutions of various African states (under civilian regimes) guarantee fundamental human rights, nevertheless, the governments flaunt these rights. The violations include the suppression of the freedom of speech, of the press, and of association. Moreover, both the real and perceived opponents. of governments are harassed, intimidated; imprisonedand even killed.
Another feature is that it has produced a parasitic and kleptocratic compradorial class. This class consists of both the local state managers and indigenous entrepreneurs. The former manages the state apparatus, and the latter controls small portions of the economy-real estate, farms, etc. As a class, they are collaborators of the foreign-based owners of capital. Collectively, the two groups constitute the ruling classes. The neocolonial state serves as the principal source for the private accumulation of capital for the compradors. Accordingly, individuals will go to great length to work for, and control state power. For example, the various factions of the compradorial class usually employ various means - bribery, ethnicity, sabotage, etc. - to gain the advantage.
The result is that the compradors and their allies have become parasites and kleptocrats: They rely on plundering the state coffers, illegal contracts, and bribery to make their living. There is a repository of evidence to suppport the fact that various members of the African ruling classes have enriched themselves at the expense of the state - Banbaginda in Nigeria, Doe in Liberia, Boigny in the Ivory Coast, Moi in Kenya, Mobutu in Zaire, to name a few. Amilcar Cabral provides the following illuminating description of the African compradorial class:
A pseudo-bourgeoisie controlled by the ruling class of the dominating country ... thus the local bourgeoisie, however strongly nationalistic it may be, cannot effectively fulfill its historic function; it cannot freely direct the development of the productive forces; in brief, it cannot be a nationalistic bourgeoisie. (12)
The Neocolonial Peripheral Capitalist Economies
The economies of African states are anchored on a peripheral capitalist mode of production and its associated relations. These peripheral capitalist economies are products of the colonial era. During colonialism, when African states were incorporated into the intemational capitalist system, their economies were transformed from being generally self-sufficient . in the production of food and other products, to becoming plantations for the production of raw materials to feed the industrial machines of the metropolitan powers.
Characteristically, these peripheral capitalist economies have several common features. First, they are monocultural: much of Africa is dependent upon one, major product- agricultural or mineral-as the chief source of foreign earnings. For examply, Mauritius gets about 90 percent of its earnings from groundnuts and groundnut oil exports.(13) Second, they lack an industrial base; accordingly, they are export enclaves. Thus, African states produce what they do not consume, and consume what they do not produce. Third, the productive base is narrow, in terms of size and the range of goods produced. Fourth, there are no intersectoral linkages, among the various sectors of the economies; hence, whatever little technology that is introduced in one sector does not spill over to the others. Fifth, there are dual economies within each African state: They monetized sector is urban-based, and serves as the major center of the available little economic activities. On the other hand, the traditional rural-based sector where the vast majority of the people live (about 70% of the total population of Africa) is based primarily on subsistent agriculture. Importantly, there are no meaningful and productive linkages between the two sectors.
Cumulatively, the neocolonial' state and its peripheral capitalist economy have precipitated various crises and problems in African states, due to their intrinsic nature: They are designed to serve the interest of external powers, not their own. Overall, while capitalism may have spurred production, and raised living standards in Western countries, its "magical trickle down effect" has not been felt especially at the grassroots level in African states. Indeed, capitalism as practiced in the continent has produced poverty, hunger, unemployment, decreasing standards of living, repression and conflicts in Africa. Paul Baran describes the deleterious effects capitalism has had on African states thus:
[Capitalism] introduced [in Africa and other third world regions] with rapidity, an the economic and social tensions inherent in the capitalist order... It substituted market contracts for such paternalistic relationships as still survived from century to century. It reoriented the partly or wholly self-sufficient economies of agricultural countries toward the production of marketable commodities. It linked their economic fate with the vagaries of the World market and connected it with the fever curve of international price movements. (14)
Also, collective economic performance has been particularly dismal with an average GDP growth rate of only 0.4 percent for the region as a whole during 1980-1987. (15) Similarly, there has been a sharp decline in the standard of living particularly for the most vulnerable groups; namely, women, youth, the disabled and the aged. (16) Additionally, the economic crisis has also been characterized by the disintegration of productive and infrastructural facilities.(17) Agricultural output and particularly food production has been reduced substantially.(18) Consequently, according to the Food and Agricultural Organization, about 70% of Africa's population did not have enough food to eat in the 1980s.
Another major problem has been the region's debt crisis.(19) For example, total debt rose from $175 billion in 1991, to $194.3 billion in 1992. One of the major consequences has and continues to be, the practice of spending the bulk of foreign exchange earnings on debt servicing; thus, it makes it impossible for these countries to attend to their deteriorating domestic economic and social problems.
Furthermore, between 1981 and 1985 respectively, Western private banks, official sources and international financial institutions siphoned off about $26.8 billion in the form of profits and debt servicing.(20) Similarly, in 1986, some 16 African Countries transferred 350 percent more money to the IMF than they received from it in 1985.(21)
In the area of social services and welfare, education, public health and sanitation, housing and portable water have rapidly deteriorated.(22) For example, in 1990, adult literacy rate stood at 51%.(23) Between 1985 and 1992, only 56% of the total population had access to health services.(24) In 1994, life expectancy stood at 52 years.(25)
These crises of underdevelopment have made the neocolonial state more repressive and militaristic. For example, in the 1980s, African states spent more than $20 billion on the purchase of weapons from the major powers. Similarly, between : 1990- 1991, military expenditures was 43% of education and health allocations in the collective budgets of African states. Significantly, it is the African peoples who have, and continue to be, the primary victims of the wave of repression and militarization. For example, ninety percent of the African military, police and other security apparatus are directed against sectors of the local population, who oppose the prevailing harsh political economy.(26)
The crises of underdevelopment - conflict nexus
Amid economic crises and repression, the African masses have become disenchanted, disappointed and disgusted. In turn, the feelings of anger and frustration have fueled the flames of conflicts. For example, at the begining of 1991, 15 African wars took their daily casualties.(27) The legitimate economic, political and social grievances of the African peoples have provided arenas for opportunists and hard-core ethnicists to whip up ethnic tensions, as a means of reducing their transaction cost in their personal quest for power. In other words, most of the civil conflicts in Africa essentially have at their bases the issues of political and socio-economic power: The perennial locus of these conflicts is that a small compradorial class has monopolized power, and excluded the majority of the population. But, in their endeavor to advance their agendas, various factional leaders, often masquerading as the champions of suppressed ethnic groups, tend to divert these conflicts from the central issues that occasioned them. The cases of Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia are quite instructive.
Civil conflicts have affected African states in several ways. First, they prevent long- term development planning. Second, they destroy the already underdeveloped infrastructure. Third, they have a personnel toll as manifested in refugees, displaced persons and deaths. In turn, these result in output reductions, particularly in the agricultural sector.(28) Even those countries which are not the locations of these conflicts get affected: Their meager resources are stretched to the limits, in trying to provide food and shelter for refugees. Fourth, they provide external actors - both imperialist powers and arm merchants - to strengthen their stranglehold on African states. These external actors sell arms to the various factions, and the various imperialist powers support various factions and clients in the conflict. In some cases, imperialist powers like France have intervened directly with their own troops - Gabon, Rwanda, Zaire. As Keith Somerville notes, "... outside powers' presence has escalated, prolonged and frequently prevented the conclusion of the conflicts".(29)
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The prospects for democracy and peace in Africa
The framework for democracy and peace
The leadership necessary for promoting democratization and peace in Africa needs to be provided by Africans themselves. In other words, "foreign" analysts can only help, they cannot determine the future of African States because they do not have a full, deep and comprehensive understanding of the culture and obstacles to democratization and peace in Africa, irrespective of their academic training, experience, and the number of visits they may have made to various African states.
A second consideration is that the analyses of the impediments to democracy and peace must be comprehensive: It must take into account the historical development of African states, particularly their exploitation, subordination and marginalization by some Wester countries. Such a perspective would contribute to the development of"strategies for promoting democracy and peace in Africa. If the arialyses are ahistorical and superficial, the resultant solutions will be the same.
Third, the experiences of Westers countries cannot be superimposed on Africa. This is because each country has different experiences; thus, the solutions to its problems must be drawn from those experiences and the prevailing objective conditions within it. Put simply, it is important for African countries to learn from the experiences of Western countries, but it is unrealistic and counterproductive for Western countries to require African countries to replicate their models of governance and economic development verbatim. As Martin Klein notes, "African nations will have to define their own form of democracy ..."(30)
The conditions for democracy and peace
In order to facilitate democratization and peace, African states must endeavor to meet and fulfill several conditions. First, the neocolonial state needs to be restructured. The new African state must be grounded in a political culture that is based on the supremacy of the constitution and the law, good and accountable leadership, and an informed and civic-minded citizenry. These arrangements must be designed by the African states themselves, based on their individual experiences, resources and experiences. In other words, they should not simply seek to replicate the American presidential system, the British Westminster Model and the French Mixed System.
Moreover, the constitutional architecture should clearly delineate the fundamental human rights of individuals and groups, and lay out the powers, structures and processes of the government. At the base of the design must be the supremacy of the African masses.
The other central features of the new political culture should be the promotion of political pluralism, tolerance for opposing views and agendas and the sanctity of the "rule of law": From the top government official to the private citizen no one must be above the law.
Furthermore, the raisons d'etre of the state should be to serve the interest of the peoples of Africa, not external ones. Specifically, the restructured African state must use its resources to improve the living conditions of the people - providing them with education, healthcare, housing, employment opportunities, etc.
Similarly, the coercive instruments of the state should not be used to suppress the rights of workers, teachers, students, civil servants and others, even if they oppose the policies of the regime in power. In the same vein, the ruling class should not be allowed to use state power to suppress the masses and facilitate private accumulation of capital by both local and foreign capitalists. Instead, the power of the state should be used to ensure that foreign multinationals and other businesses operate in ways that benfit the people.
Additionally, the peripheral capitalist economy must be altered. For example, African states should combine their individual and collective resources in establishing industrial bases. This will have several positive effects: 1) It will prevent them from being reliant on one major product as the mainstay of their economies; 2) the related point is that it will facilitate the diversification of their economies; thus, their vulnerability to the fluctuations in the prices of their raw materials on the capitalist markets will be reduced; and 3) they will have the capacity to tum their raw materials into finished goods, thereby reducing their dependence on Western countries for aid and imports. Some efforts in this regard are being made in West and Southers Africa; however, these efforts need to be accelerated.
Another area that African states need to develop is their agricultural sector, particularly their capacity to produce food. This will help feed their population, and reduce hunger, malnutrition and disease. Also, African states could sell surplus food to other countries; this would enable them to accumulate capital, which could be used for various development projects.
Renewed emphasis needs to be placed on the development of human resources. This would entail the building of more and better institutions of learning, including vocational and technical ones. The curricula need to be revamped so that students can develop the requisite skills and knowledge that would help make them serviceable to their respective countries, rather than to foreign capital. Clearly, "economic salvation" rests to a large measure on the capacity to develop a human resources pool which could enhance the technological know-how that is crucial to the economic transformation of Africa.
African countries need to combine their resources in exploring ways to unshackle themselves from the "debt trap", in which they have been placed by Western countries, their private banks and international financial institutions. Such efforts should include the renegotiation of the terms of their debt.
Significantly, efforts need to be made to reinvest capital in African states. The trend has been that African entrepreneurs and others usually take billions of dollars out of their respective countries, and invest them in banks and other businesses in Western countries. The net effect has been, and still is the fact that it deprives African countries of major source of capital, which could be used to invest in various worthwhile development projects. This is one area in which the restructured African state can play a pivotal role.
Another central issue is removing the "urban-rural divide". This process needs to be anchored on a balanced development strategy that focuses on both the urban and rural areas. In other words, development projects, employment opportunities and social services should be equally distributed between the urban and rural areas. An integral part of this exercise should be including and encouraging the rural dwellers to fully participate in the formulation and implementation of projects affecting their respective areas. The development of the infrastructure, especially in the rural area, is imperative.
Clearly, African states need new corps of leaders. These must have an understanding of their respective countries and the region's problems, and a vision for the future. Importantly, they must be linked to the people at all times, and especially be willing to listen and learn from them. Moreover, they must eschew the personality cult, and its attendant vagaries that have undermined democratization, development and peace in the region. In other words, the new leadership must work with the people in developing concrete programs that would help rescue African states from the morass of underdevelopment.
Beyond these efforts, African states need to make a serious commitment to regional cooperation. This should include the willingness to surrender areas of authority over economic and social fields to regional bodies. Clearly, since they share the problems of underdevelopment, they need to cooperate in more concrete ways, if the material conditions of both individual•states, and the region are to improve.
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Conclusion
This article has attempted to evaluate the prospects for democratization and peace in Africa. First, democratization and peace are unlikely to be achieved in Africa under the current Wester-led crusade for democratization because the process tends to focus primarily on establishing political procedures - elections, etc. - without linking them to the "bread and butter issues" that embody economic democracy.
Second, contrary to the Western view that the obstacles to democratization and peace in Africa are embedded in the internal political, economic and socio-cultural fabric of its various states, the evidence shows that the crises of underdevelopment occasioned to a large extent by Western exploitation are the principal impediments.
Third and related, the neocolonial African state which has served as the conduit for repression, oppression and exploitation cannot play the role of purveyor of democracy. Alternatively, the neocolonial state and its structures must be transformed so that they serve. the interests of the peoples of Africa, rather than those of the African ruling classes and their extemal patrons.
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Notes and references
1 Jeffress Ramsay, Africa (Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group Inc., 1993), p. 3.
2 Ibid.
3 See Sahr Kpundeh (Ed.), Democratization in Africa; African Views and Voices (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992), p. 1 .
4 Jean-Pierre Langellier, Le Monde, May 1990, pp. 6-7.
5 Julius Ihonvbere, Democratization in Africa; Challenges and Prospects, Keynote Address delivered at the Twelve Annual Conference of the Association of Third World Studies, held in Williamsburg, Virginia, October 7, 1995, p. 1.
6 Ihonvbere, op. cit., p. 2.
7 See Martin Klein, "Back to Democracy: Presidential Address to the 1991 Annual Conference of the African Studies Association," African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1992, p. 5.
8 Ibid.
9 See Michael Crowder, "'Whose Dream Was It Anyway?' Twenty-five years of African Independence," African Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 342, 1987, p. 11.
10 Bade Onimode, The Political Economy of the African Crisis (London: Zed press, 1988), p. 130.
11 See Crawford Young, "The Post-Colonial State and Post-Colonial Crisis," in: Prosser Gifford and William Louis, Decolonization and African Independence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 3.
12 Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (London: Stage 1, 1969), p. 5.
13 See Kofi Hadjar, On Transforming Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1987), p. 9.
14 Paul Baran, "On the Political Economy of Backwardness," in: Charles Wilber (Ed.), The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 97.
15 See United Nations Economic Commision for Africa, African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes For Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (New, York: United Nations Publications, 1989), p. 1.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Klein, op. cit., p. 8. '
20 See Frederick Clairmonte and John Cavanagh, "Impossible Debt on Road to Global Ruin," Guardian, 9 January 1987, p. 1.
21 Ramsey, op. cit., p. 6.
22 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, op. cit., p. 1.
23 See Bread for the World Institute, Causes of Hunger (Silver Springs, MD: Communications and Graphics, 1994), p. 109.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 See Herbert Ekwe-Eiwe, Conflict and Intervention in Africa; Nigeria, Angola and Zaire (London: Macmillan. 1990), p. 154.
27 See Richard Solar and Mark Stege, "Finding Peace Through Democracy in Sahelian Africa," Africa (Guilford, CT: The Dushkin Publishing Group, 1993), p. 195.
28 See Nicole Ball, "The Effect of Conflict on the Economies of Third World Countries," in: I. William Zartman and Francis Deng, Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 256.
29 Keith Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), p. ix.
30 Klein. op. cit., p. 7.
ABSTRACT
The paper examines three interrelated issues: 1) The nature and dynamics of the Western-led "crusade for democratization in Africa"; 2) the obstacles to democratization and peace; and 3) the prospects for democratization and peace. The major finding is that because the Western-led crusade emphasizes political procedures, and neglects the centrality of "bread and butter issues", it will not facilitate democratization and peace.
This opinion article was written by a independent writer. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily intended to reflect those of GRILA | |
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